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Capital Mobility Versus Unity of Purpose:
Urban Redevelopment in Buffalo, N.Y.
and Pittsburgh, Pa.
DOUGLAS G. KORITZ*
T HE depression of 1980-82 punctuated decades of decline in Buffalo,
Las in many other manufacturing areas. The loss of more than
43,000 manufacturing jobs between 1979 and 1983 lent new urgency to
the search for models of successful urban revitalization. Seemingly with
one voice, the disparate communities that are the Buffalo metropolitan
area found in Pittsburgh an example deemed worthy of emulation.1 Like
Buffalo, Pittsburgh is an old center of the metal-bending industries; like
Buffalo, Pittsburgh has been losing its manufacturing base at least since
the early 1950's; and like Buffalo, Pittsburgh's manufacturing employ-
ment dropped on the order of 30% during the early 1980's.2 But unlike
Buffalo, Pittsburgh seemed to have weathered the storm and even, in the
case of its downtown, thrived. So Buffalo's business elite look to Pitts-
burgh's glitzy downtown and see in it the very paradigm of a "public-
private partnership" for economic rebirth.
The lavish praise for Pittsburgh's "Renaissance" in Buffalo's busi-
ness press may come as a surprise to the more than 70,000 workers who
lost their jobs in and around Pittsburgh during the early 1980's. This
fact has not been lost on community activists in Buffalo. They look not
to Pittsburgh's redeveloped downtown, but to its relatively well-organ-
ized, grass roots effort to save manufacturing jobs and rebuild devastated
* The author would like to thank Linda Hassberg, Frank Munger and Peter Pitegoff for their
perceptive comments on a previous draft of this article.
1. See, eg., Renaissance of Pittsburgh Can Serve as Lesson for Buffalo on Cooperation, Buffalo
News, March 13, 1988 at 1, col. 3. The Coalition for Economic Justice (CEJ), formerly the Coali-
tion of Religious, University, Community, and Union Leaders (CRUCUL), is the Buffalo affiliate of
the Federation for Industrial Retention and Renewal (FIRR). As such there is frequent reference in
CEJ meetings to FIRR's Pittsburgh affiliate which is a mainstay of the organization.
2. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTIcs, EMPLOYMENT, HOURS AND EARNINGS, STATES AND AR-
EAS/U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (1982); Doolittle, Adjustments in Buffalo's Labor Market, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK Q. REv. (Winter 1985/86); Koritz, Restructuring or Destructur-
ing? Deindustrialization in Two Industrial Heartland Cities (forthcoming in URB. AFF. Q. June,
1991).
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neighborhoods.3 Unfortunately, these efforts have failed to save many
jobs, or rebuild neighborhoods. While its downtown is crowded with ar-
chitectural symbols of corporate power, Pittsburgh's manufacturing sec-
tor has fared no bettef than Buffalo's.
The seeds of this failure were sown immediately after World War
Two (WWII), when local corporate and financial elites combined to ef-
fect major revisions in Pittsburgh's economic and physical landscape.
Pittsburgh's corporate elite forged coalitions, immobilized opposition,
and obtained cooperation of local government for its restructuring pro-
gram. Their control of the redevelopment agenda has survived nearly
five decades intact. The economic elite of Buffalo have never attained the
degree of control over the public agenda that existed in Pittsburgh. They
have, however, prevented others from effecting their own development
strategies. The inability of Buffalo elites to cooperate effectively may fi-
nally provide space, albeit limited space, for labor and community based
development strategies. But this may be changing.
Buffalo may be at a point analogous to post-WWII Pittsburgh. A
critical mass of the remaining corporate structure have significant assets
that cannot be easily relocated. This immobility may force a commit-
ment to redeveloping the area. The formation of elite groups in Buffalo,
such as "group of 18,"1 indicates that the economic elite may be ap-
proaching the type of collaborative effort that redeveloped Pittsburgh.
Should they succeed, the window of opportunity that currently exists for
community-based redevelopment strategies may well close.
Under what conditions can or will local capital act as a group en-
gaging in active restructuring? First, in the language of game-theory, a
restructuring effort is likely when and where the redevelopment "game"
can be turned from a competitive into a cooperative game. Second, even
if the conditions for cooperation exist among the elite, there is no guaran-
tee that cooperation will out-perform the most likely competitive out-
comes. The direct and indirect benefits generated by the cooperative
effort must be quantitatively large enough, and distributed such that each
player receives enough benefit to justify continued participation. Third,
attention should be given to the institutional and political environment in
which business elites organize their consensus matters. There are many
3. Eg., The Steel Valley Authority, The Tri-State Conference on Steel, and The United Steel
workers of America.
4. The group of 18 was formed in 1985. See 'Group of 18' Strives to Boost Economy, Buffalo
News, Oct 12, 1986, at A-l, col. 2, for an account and membership list.
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and treacherous political reefs capable of sinking a coalition, especially in
its formative years.
This article explores some of the factors determining whether or not
a local economic elite can and will cooperate to effect urban economic
restructuring, and some of the implications for community-led restruc-
turing. Competition among elites, and among communities, hinders
agreement on a common redevelopment strategy. Capital mobility has a
similar effect. The relative concentration of capital in Pittsburgh, as op-
posed to its fragmented nature in Buffalo, improved the prospects for
elite cooperation there. The elite in Pittsburgh took advantage of a con-
ducive political and institutional environment in organizing their redevel-
opment effort via a private agency. Global and local change in economic
structure have played crucial limiting and enabling roles in both areas.'
STRUCTURE VERSUS INITIATIVE
Global, or "aspatial", and local economic structure channels the ini-
tiative of those who would redevelop a metropolitan area. No matter
what any individual or group in Buffalo does, the global trends that have
resulted in the loss of much of Buffalo's industry cannot be reversed.
Neither Pittsburgh nor Buffalo can replace Santa Clara County, Califor-
nia, the famous "Silicon Valley", as the center of the nation's electronics
industry. At the same time, local decisions can alter local economic
structure. The structural parameters limiting redevelopment, whether
led by the elite or non-elite, are broader than many realize. Every now
and then the channel bifurcates. This is the case in Buffalo today where,
in contrast to Pittsburgh, the economic elite has no entrenched redevel-
opment strategy. The economic elite of Pittsburgh intervened at a junc-
ture when Pittsburgh could well have followed Buffalo in losing its
corporate headquarters as well as its metal-bending manufacturing. De-
cisions taken in Pittsburgh during the decade following WWII weakened
5. For a discussion of geographic scale see N. SMITH, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT at 135-147
(1984). Most discussions of economic or social structure ignore the implications of geographic scale.
As we move from large scale or "macro" views to smaller scales, the influence of individual particu-
lars increases. The debate over structuralism, methodological individualism, post-structuraism, has
yet to be joined by many mainstream economists. But see, generally, 1 METHODUS: THE BULLETIN
OF THE INTERNATIONAL NETWORK FOR ECONOMIC METHOD (1989).
6. Economic structure has different meanings depending on theoretical framework. Generally it
includes, to one degree or another, input-output relationships; external economies and diseconomies;
legal and political environment; and social class as variously defined. The argument here does not
depend on any one particular definition, although it excludes some of the most naive of the "free
market" and neoclassical interpretations. Notice that all frameworks include something like social
class.
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its traditional complex of heavy manufacturing industries, enabling its
corporate control and finance complex to survive. To this day the most
obvious difference between the two cities, subjected to the same global
pressures, is that Pittsburgh has a major corporate headquarter sector
and Buffalo does not.
The global changes which shaped the post-war economies of Pitts-
burgh and Buffalo precluded some formerly successful forms of local eco-
nomic development, but opened the way for others. The single-location
entrepreneurial firm could no longer serve as the bed rock of economic
growth. Through the latter half of the 19th century, the profits from
commerce and industrial production were reinvested, continually updat-
ing production techniques and increasing the scale of operations.7 The
economy came to be dominated by organizations commanding massive
resources, often exercising control over technological change. The anar-
chy of the marketplace cannot coordinate such large scale organizations
by itself. In what Keynes called "mature" capitalism, a much higher
degree of extra-market planning, either in the public or private sphere, is
required for metropolitan restructuring.8 The coordination functions of
government and private organizations are especially important in local
redevelopment. A large public sector is a permanent feature of the eco-
nomic environment on a national scale, and on a metropolitan scale.9
The national political climate during the decade following WWII
greatly circumscribed the ability of organized labor and community
groups to influence redevelopment strategy.10 A long series of political
setbacks for organized labor, starting with the Taft-Hartly Act, checked
7. See Houston, A History of Capital Accumulation in Pittsburgh: A Marxist Interpretation, 10
REV. OF REGIONAL STUD. 12 (1979-80), for an account of the economic development of Pittsburgh.
See M. GOLDMAN, HIGH HOPES: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF BUFFALO, NEW YORK (1983) for a
history of Buffalo.
8. Keynes argued that in "mature" capitalism a shortfall in demand, or excess capacity, is sys-
temic. Keynes emphasized the coordination role of macroeconomic policy. To the degree that local
government is financed by the federal government, it can be viewed as an extension of the federal
government. See J.M. KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY
(1965).
9. There have been numerous attempts at periodization of capitalist history. The great con-
servative economist Joseph Schumpeter divided history into long cycles or "Kondratief cycles." See,
J. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES (1939). For a useful review of the Social Structures of Accumu.
lation and the Regulation School approaches see Kotz, A Comparative analysis of the theory of regu-
lation and the social structure of accumulation theory, 54 Sm. & Soc'y 1, 5-28 (Spring, 1990). The
argument here does not necessarily rest on any single one of these approaches.
10. See, eg., J.H. MOLLENKOF, THE CONTESTED CITY (1983) and S. FAINSTEIN,
N.FAINSTEIN, R.C. HILL, D. JUDD & M.P. SMITH, RESTRUCTURING THE CITY: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT (1983).
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unions' ability to intervene in investment and location decisions. Mc-
Carthyism dampened both labor and community activism."1 This left
local economic elites with broad discretion in determining local develop-
ment strategy - if they could exercise it as a group. Thus economic
changes on the national and global scale both forced abandonment of old
local structure, and provided avenues along which local elites could effect
local change.
The economic structure of a metropolitan area also imposes limits
on, and creates opportunities for local decision-makers. The bifurcated
economic structure that emerged in Pittsburgh prior to World War Two
provided the basis for post-war restructuring. The Pittsburgh area econ-
omy was, and to some extent still is, made up not of a single, unified
structure, but rather multiple structures with common ancestry. In the
19th century corporate headquarters were located in Pittsburgh for the
same reason that Buffalo had its complement of major corporate head-
quarters - because production was also there.12 Increases in the scale
of production, improving communications and transportation, and cata-
clysmic labor-management conflict during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century enabled or forced the spatial separation of functions
within the corporation.13 Management and control functions had little
11. For an account of Buffalo's particularly virulent McCarthyism see M. GOLDMAN, supra
note 7, at 242-66.
12. The existence of corporate headquarters in Pittsburgh stems largely from its former status as
the premier steel-producing region in the nation, an important center of the electrical machinery and
industrial equipment industries (Westinghouse, Pittsburgh Plate Glass), and from the Mellon family.
See Koritz, supra note 2.
13. David Noble argues that technological changes adopted represent an attempt by capital to
cope with class conflict as much as, or more than intra-capitalist competition. See D. NOBLE,
AMERICA BY DESIGN (1977) and Noble, Social Choice in Machine Design: The Case of Automati-
cally Controlled Machine Tools, in CASE STUDIES ON THE LABOR PROCESS 18 (A. Zimbalist ed.
1979). See also, H. Braverman, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL (1974) (which precipitated a
vigorous debate over technological change and the work process) and Shaihk, Political Economy and
Capitalism: Notes on Dobb's Theory of Crisis, 2 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 233 (1978). Pred, on the other
hand, argues that changes in technology caused the transformation of the system of cities in the U.S.
See A. PRED, CITY SYSTEMS IN ADVANCED ECONOMY (1977). Robert B. Cohen represents a third
position, which perhaps can be viewed as falling somewhere in between Noble and Pred. He argues
that the concentration and centralization of capital made management far more complex. This shifts
location advantages to cities with considerable expertise in management consulting, business serv-
ices. See Cohen, The Internationalization of Capital and U.S. Cities (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, New School for Social Research 1979).
Notice that the technological determinist argument is the preferred view of elite planners. It
removes the need to consult community. It makes community-based redevelopment initiative ap-
pear as a side-show. The real event has to do with either old or newly emerging business elites, and
perhaps educational elites. See the Neo-Schumpeterian literature on long waves and urban develop-
ment: Friedmann, A General Theory of Polarized Development, in GROWTH CENTERS IN RE-
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need for proximity to production, and existed in clusters of interrelation-
ships that did not include inputs from, or services to productive facilities
that could not normally be taken over phone lines. 14  So when the Mel-
Ions founded Alcoa, its headquarters were in Pittsburgh, but production
was in Niagara Falls, N.Y.15 The corporate control and finance cluster
coexisted with production clusters, but increasingly routinized interac-
tion between the two reduced or eliminated the need for proximity. 6
This created the basis for a restructuring effort led by finance capital.
Buffalo, too, emerged from WWII with a dual economic structure.
In fact the situation at the end of the war might have led the observer to
forecast a similar trajectory for the two cities. Unfortunately, Buffalo's
corporate management sector began disintegrating within the year, and
continued to do so over the next two decades. The headquarters of cor-
porations with more than local operations, like Curtis Wright and
Houdialle, were lost to relocation or merger.1 7 Throughout the post-war
period, the finance and management of corporations in Buffalo was in-
creasingly controlled by outside headquarters. This post-war trend was
foreshadowed by the 1922 Bethlehem steel purchase of Lackawanna
steel, just south of the Buffalo city line. This represented the consolida-
tion of some 46 firms into a single firm with a single front office not
GIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 82 (N. Hansen ed. 1972); Hall, The Geography of the Fifth
Kondratieff, in SILICON LANDSCAPES 1 (P. Hall & A.R. Markusen eds. 1985); R.D. Norton & J.
Rees, The Product Life Cycle and the Spatial Decentralization of American Manufacturing, 13 RE-
GIONAL STUD. 141 (1979). Implicitly, what is best for local "entrepreneurs" and innovators is best
for local economy. Research & Development is not fundamentally threatening to elites except when
a new elite challenges an old elite. This, as Hall and Checkland suggest, is rare. See S.G. CHECK-
LAND, THE UPAS TREE (1975).
14. The top of the hierarchy of the financial sector was concentrated in New York City for
access to European capital, but the glamour and glitz of Manhattan overshadows the fact that New
York was a manufacturing powerhouse as well. Indeed, New York had long-established dual struc-
ture. See Chinitz, Contrasts in Agglomeration: New York and Pittsburgh, reprinted in URBAN ECO-
NOMICS: READINGS AND ANALYSIS (R.E. Grieson ed. 1973).
15. For more than a century the Mellon family has dominated the financial community in Pitts-
burgh. Richard King Mellon was the Mellon patriarch during most of the post-war period. See B.
HERSH, THE MELLON FAMILY: A FORTUNE IN HISTORY (1978).
16. According to product life cycle theory routinized interaction is a characteristic of "older"
industries. There is little reason for face-to-face interaction in these cases, and thus little reason for
agglomeration in centers of innovative activity. See S. HIRSCH, THE LOCATION OF INDUSTRY AND
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS (1967); and the Neo-Schumpeterian sources cited supra note
13.
17. The difference between Buffalo and Pittsburgh is not only one of size. Other small cities, in
fact some that are smaller than Buffalo, retained their corporate headquarters. Dayton, Ohio, for
example, still has three Fortune 500 corporate headquarters. Buffalo has none. For a litany of
relocation and bankruptcy in the first two decades following WWII, see M. GOLDMAN, supra note 7,
at 267-77.
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located in Buffalo."8 The transportation system that had made Buffalo
prime industrial and commercial real estate, increasingly bypassed the
area. The 1959 opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway hastened the de-
cline. Thus, while Buffalo's ample if aged manufacturing sector
atrophied, the other economic clusters disintegrated.
The survival of a corporate control and the finance cluster in Pitts-
burgh did not, by itself, ensure continued prosperity. Corporate head-
quarters could still have disappeared from the local scene via relocation,
merger and bankruptcy. 19 Nor did the disintegration, soon after WWII,
of the corporate headquarter cluster rule out the successful redevelop-
ment of Buffalo. It was the concerted effort of the corporate elite in Post-
War Pittsburgh and the lack thereof in Buffalo that led to differing trajec-
tories of the two cities.
In Pittsburgh restructuring was the result of a purposeful redevelop-
ment effort on the part of the economic elite. As the economy geared up
for WWII the Melons increasingly found themselves rulers of a crum-
bling kingdom. By then the two sides of the Pittsburgh economy -
heavy manufacturing on one hand, corporate finance and control on the
other - had become mutually exclusive. Air pollution generated by
Pittsburgh's heavy industry resulted in frequent darkness at noon. This
made the recruiting and retention of management personnel difficult for
corporate headquarters. The problem was so acute that three major cor-
porations (Westinghouse, Alcoa, and U.S. Steel) were threatening to
move their headquarters out of Pittsburgh. World War II brought with
it a reprieve from decline for Pittsburgh both as a manufacturing center
and as a corporate headquarters city. The corporate headquarters that
were poised to relocate, were prevented from doing so by wartime re-
source controls. The Mellons took advantage of this reprieve by plan-
ning to protect their assets in Pittsburgh. In a 1943, Richard King
Mellon set in motion a cooperative restructuring effort. The institutional
vehicle for this effort was the Allegheny Conference on Community De-
velopment (ACCD), formed just after the war. The ACCD was from its
inception an organization of, for, and by the economic elite.20
Toward its goal of making the "Smokey City" safe for corporate
18. See T.E. LEARY & E.C. SCHOLES, FROM FIRE TO RuSm: BUSINESS, TECHNOLOGY AND
WORK AT THE LACKAWANNA STEEL PLANT, 1899-1983 (1987).
19. The same technological and social change that enabled spatial separation of corporate con-
trol and production, also enabled large scale integration via merger. Often as not, the top manage-
ment disappeared from the vicinity of production when one corporation was absorbed by another
headquartered in a distant city.
20. See R. LUBOVE, TWENTIETH CENTURY PI'rSBURGH: GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS AND EN-
1991]
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headquarters and high finance, the ACCD devised general plans that be-
came the basis of Pittsburgh's "Renaissance I," and hired professionals
to make specific proposals. The first, and most famous, was the initia-
tion, along with a coalition of other groups, of sweeping air pollution
controls. Flood control, drinking water and sewage, and parking and
highway projects also received high ACCD priority. The ACCD initi-
ated and/or participated in numerous "urban renewal" projects. The
construction of a new Civic Arena eliminated low income black housing
close to downtown, and created a buffer between downtown and The
Hill, a black community. The Point Park and Gateway Center projects
cleared rail yards and other undesirable land uses from downtown, and
created some open green space. The list goes on, and does not include
projects aimed at strengthening heavy industry.21
COOPERATION VERSUS COMPETITION
At the same time as the ACCD was cutting its teeth in Pittsburgh,
what unity had been forged among Buffalo elites was in the process of
coming undone. Immediately after WWII nearly every obstacle to elite
collaboration beset Buffalo. The end of the war unleashed an orgy of
relocation in manufacturing industries, both of production and adminis-
tration. A fractious political environment made cooperation with the
government, and among the elite, difficult. Competitive tensions proved
too strong for a collaborative redevelopment effort.
Absent a large and steady influx of resources, urban redevelopment
requires some form of collective action. This is true because of global
and local economic structure, the pivotal role of government, and the
very nature of economic development itself. According to some theo-
rists, local and even national economic development occurs when a clus-
ter of mutually reinforcing industries develops within a single
metropolitan area.2" As firms agglomerate their direct, private costs,
such as transportation costs, fall. More importantly, they generate both
technological (static) and pecuniary (dynamic) external economies.23
VIRONMENTAL CHANGE (1969) [hereinafter, LUBOVE, TWENTIETH CENTURY PITTSBURGH];
PITTSBURGH (R. Lubove ed. 1976).
21. For a list of ACCD projects during its first two decades see sources cited supra note 20.
22. Isard & Schooler, Industrial Complex Analysis: Agglomeration, Economics and Regional
Development, J. REGIONAL SCI. 19 (spring, 1959) and the growth pole literature. See, e.g.,
GROWTH CENTERS IN REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (N. Hansen ed. 1972).
23. External economies or beneficial externalities are defined as benefits generated by one eco-
nomic actor that are, or can be enjoyed by another without paying compensation. A "public" or
"collective" good represents an activity that generates external benefits almost exclusively. The text-
416 [Vol. 39
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While private activity creates these external economies, they are collec-
tively consumed. The benefits of external economies are distributed ac-
cording to the ability to exploit them rather than on the basis of a quid
pro quo. No economic actor can easily be excluded from enjoying these
benefits.
Because much, if not most of the benefits from local restructuring
efforts are external in nature, a single capital or firm acting alone to effect
local restructuring is unlikely to realize non-negative returns on the ef-
fort. Most of the benefit will dissipate to other firms or to the general
public. The elite individual with an interest in local redevelopment faces
something of a prisoner's dilemma. His/her action is contingent upon
the action of a critical mass of others, which is subject to uncertainty.
The likelihood of an individual capital realizing benefits from rede-
velopment is substantially reduced when some of a region's major players
are not cooperating. In this respect local economic restructuring efforts
are not unlike cartels. To the extent that a cooperative effort might force
resource commitment (e.g., via taxes), players outside of the "cartel" are
likely to oppose it. Thus major players outside the redevelopment "car-
tel" are a threat to its success. To a firm planning to relocate, commit-
ting economic and political resources to a local redevelopment effort
represents a cost for which there is no possible return. In the Buffalo of
the late 1940's and early 1950's, with so many firms relocating there were
more outside than in any single group with serious redevelopment inter-
ests. Even when a collaborative agreement has been attained, strong in-
book definition of a collective good involves "nonexcludibility," that is no quid pro quo can be
extracted easily, and "nondiminishability," that is consumption by an individual does not diminish
the amount available to others, over a significant and relevant range.
Scitovsky's distinction between static or "technological," and dynamic, or "pecuniary," externali-
ties is useful here. Static externalities are defined in relation to general equilibrium. They arise from
relations among economic actors not mediated through the market. Air pollution and highway
congestion are examples. The benefits firms derive from a mutually created pool of skilled labor can
also be thought of as, at least in part, static externalities. Pecuniary externalities, on the other hand,
remain undefined in a general equilibrium context, for they are based on disequilibrium.
Pecuniary externalities arise from the real world violation of the conditions for general equilib-
rium and are generally transmitted via monetary intermediation. They result from investment
projects, especially those embodying significant innovation, that require a "non-negative" (to use
Schumpeter's term) gestation period. The "lumpiness" of investment projects is one source of pecu-
niary externalities; the very existence of investment opportunities at above the "normal" profit rate is
another. An investment that helps draw the economy away from the neighborhood of a general
equilibrium will in general yield some pecuniary externalities. Whenever investment and/or innova-
tion in one industry affects profitability in another, pecuniary externalities may exist. See Scitovsky,
TWo Concepts of External Economies, in THE ECONOMICS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT (A.N.
Agarwala & S.P. Singh ed. 1958).
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centives may exist for some or all parties to cheat. The fear of this
eventuality may be enough to sour some players on participation.
There is an inherent conflict between cooperative redevelopment ef-
forts such as Pittsburgh's Renaissance, and the private control of re-
sources. Cooperative redevelopment requires the use of state power -
eminent domain, zoning, executive and legislative authority - to carry
out strategy. Businesses, however, are reluctant to allow the state or
quasi-public agencies sufficient latitude. Even under the most favorable
conditions, businesses are loathe to cede any control over their actions to
any "outside" organization, government or other interest. While this ap-
pears to have been a particularly persistent obstacle to redevelopment in
Buffalo, it is hardly unique to the area. In Pittsburgh, various configura-
tions of business, community and professional groups had attacked the
problem of air pollution before WWII, but had always failed to make
headway. The moment smoke control threatened, or appeared to con-
strain, any economic interest, regulation was either defeated or not en-
forced.2 4 It was only when Richard King Mellon and others in the
"commanding heights" of the corporate world got involved that these,
along with ideological and legal impediments were swept away. It was
not until air pollution threatened their interests, that is, when even "Mel-
lon companies" (e.g., Alcoa) were ready to abandon the area to escape it,
that the Mellons took an interest in smoke abatement.
Cooperation requires an organizing force that can impose, generate,
or obviate the need for unity of purpose among the local elites. In princi-
ple the federal government can fit the bill. By supporting innovative,
"high-tech" industries in Silicon Valley, it helped nurture the industrial
clusters necessary for local development.25 In practice, the only source
of government funds that is both adequate and reliable over a period long
enough to effect structural change is military procurement.26 Silicon
Valley's profitability has been dependent on military contracts from the
24. For a brief account of these efforts and their ultimate failure see R. LUBOVE, TWENTIETH
CENTURY PITTSBURGH, supra note 20.
25. Notice what is needed here is for the federal government to establish an industrial complex
or a growth pole. It is not enough to provide large amounts of public assistance, since this does not
create a basis for the recipient region to generate growth and development on its own. Perroux, and
others have called such a cluster a "growth pole." See GROWTH CENTERS IN REGIONAL EcO-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT (N. Hansen ed. 1972); Perroux, Note on the Concept of Growth Poles, in
REGIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 93 (D. McKee, R. Dean & W. Leahy eds. 1970).
26. For a discussion of the spatial distribution and effects of military spending see Markusen,
Defense Spending and the Geography of High-Tech Industries, in TECHNOLOGY, REGIONS AND POL-
ICY 94 (J. Rees ed. 1986). One exception might be state and national capitals.
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outset.27 This would suggest that part of the reason for Buffalo's eco-
nomic decline may have been its inability to attract sufficient federal
funding, and military procurement in particular.2" Buffalo has been the
recipient of significant federal and New York State aid. During the last
25 years, these subsidies have been significant in nearly every major un-
dertaking by the private sector in downtown Buffalo.29 Perry has sug-
gested that the Buffalo area may be developing a comparative advantage
in attracting state business subsidies. Unfortunately it falls well short of
a critical mass which, it seems, comes only from military procurement.
The implicit development strategy in Buffalo is not cooperative.
Rather it is an example of fragmented or competitive development.30
Each firm competes for a share of government funds. Together they
minimize the risk involved in cooperation. They implicitly view the ben-
efits of redevelopment as almost exclusively direct and internal, rather
than predominantly indirect and external. This form of development can
succeed provided that there are sufficient federal funds, as in Silicon Val-
ley, or some particular advantage, such as Houston's connection to the
oil industry.3" Given that Buffalo has neither sufficient federal funding
nor some particular natural advantage over other areas, the city has done
as well as can be expected given the competitive and fragmented restruc-
turing effort.
Finance capital is another logical choice as a "development cartel"
organizer, since typically it draws profits directly and indirectly from
many individual capitals and many industries. This may give managers
of finance capital both broader vision and broader influence than those
27. See Saxenian, The Genesis of Silicon Valley, in SILICON LANDSCAPES 20 (P. Hall & A.R.
Markusen eds. 1985).
28. See S. Cole & B. Strack, The BuffaloArea's Exposure to Defense Cuts, 39 BUFFALO L. REv.
385 (1991).
29. Perry, The Politics of Dependency in Deindustrializing America: The Case of Buffalo, New
York, in THE CAPITALIST CITY 113 (M. Smith & J. Feagin eds. 1987).
30. Any redevelopment effort may appear to be cooperative. Some degree of "cooperation" is
always needed since, for example, quasi-public agencies are usually required to access federal and
state urban development funds. A redevelopment effort is truly cooperative when its underlying
strategy is aimed at generating external benefits. Pittsburgh's "Renaissance" projects provided park
land, cleaner air and other benefits available to all who would or could take advantage of them. A
competitive redevelopment strategy relies primarily upon direct private benefits to individual firms
for its success. Buffalo's approach to waterfront development might be characterized as a competi-
tive strategy because it cedes external benefits of waterfront location to private developers.
31. See Saxenian, supra note 27. Large cities are a more complex, case. See, e.g., Soja, Eco-
nomic Restructuring and the Internationalization of the Los Angeles Region, in THE CAPITALIST
CITY (M.P. Smith & J.R. Feagin eds. 1987). Industrial capital depends directly on manufacturing
for its profits. Financial capital is owned and controlled via financial institiutions rather than goods
producing firms.
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caught up in a single industry.3 2 The Mellon interests, an example of
finance capital, were capable of offering attractive "carrots" and daunt-
ing "sticks" to recalcitrant corporations. Air pollution control, for ex-
ample, was achieved over the objections of some of the then important
economic and political actors in Pittsburgh and Pennsylvania. The
Pennsylvania Railroad opposed any smoke abatement enabling legisla-
tion before the state legislature that did not include an exemption for
railroads. At the time, a substantial portion of its engines were coal-
fired; smoke abatement legislation would have precluded their use in an
area which still remains as an important node in the railroad system.
After "Mellon informed the president of the Pennsylvania that other rail-
roads would be delighted to handle his business," and Fairless of U.S.
Steel "demanded cooperation," legislation passed that brought the rail-
roads under the smoke control law.33
Buffalo lacks the driving force which led Pittsburgh's Renaissance-
powerful finance capital. Buffalo's commercial past should have made it
fertile ground for strong financial institutions. Instead, the area has often
been dominated by outside financial institutions, including, coinciden-
tally, the Mellons. Marine Midland Bank is the single exception.
Marine Midland is a holding company formed in 1929 with affiliates lo-
cated throughout New York State, and its headquarter operations are
split between Buffalo and New York City. Thus even it cannot be con-
sidered a Buffalo financial institution in the same way that the Mellon
Bank is a Pittsburgh bank. Buffalo's corporate control and finance clus-
ter came undone decisively in the years immediately following WWII.
Thus, in contrast with Pittsburgh, the financial sector that was uniquely
Buffalo's was not, and perhaps is still not strong enough to lead an effec-
tive restructuring effort. Industrial and commercial capital was too frag-
mented and mobile to fill the void. The economic elite proved incapable
of avoiding public squabbles that proved fatal to agreement on an overall
redevelopment strategy.
MOBILITY VERSUS COMMITMENT
The mobility of capital in Buffalo insured that no alliance could be
forged among capitals, leaving local restructuring to the anarchy of the
32. The distinction between finance capital and industrial capital dates back to 1910. See R.
HILFERDING, DAS FINANZKAPITAL (1910).
33. LUBOVE, TWENTIETH CENTURY PIT SBURGH, supra note 20. R.K. Mellon was referring
to the shipping business of Mellon companies, not Mellon Bank, which of course did not ship much
of anything. U.S. Steel was heavily influenced by the Mellons.
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marketplace and the vicissitudes of local political alignments. Decline in
Buffalo was therefore cumulative and self-reinforcing. The relocation of
the more foot-loose capital made remaining in Buffalo more difficult for
those firms which might have preferred to do so. As a result, it became
more costly for those that did stay to make a commitment to area's rede-
velopment. The likelihood of a positive return on the economic and
political investment such a commitment would entail, was diminished
significantly. Once an individual firm had made the decision to move
their headquarters and/or production, Buffalo became a "cash cow" re-
gion for it."a Their interests thus came in conflict with those firms plan-
ning to stay. This, in turn, made class unity all the more difficult to
attain and increasingly improbable.
The Mellon interests, on the other hand, were both immobile and
capable of enticing or, failing that, coercing cooperation. The immobility
of Mellon capital forced the Melons to "stay and fight." They may well
have increased their wealth far more had they been able to move a sizable
portion of their assets out of Pittsburgh. The Mellons did attempt spatial
diversification during the 1920's but were cut off by the crash of 1929 and
then by the economic controls in effect during WWII. They were able to
strengthen their existing positions during the Great Depression, but were
unable to establish new geographic centers for operation. If anything,
their holdings became more geographically concentrated in the Pitts-
burgh area during the 1930's. They were unprepared to make the kind of
dramatic relocation in the offing at the end of the war. The fact that a
financial group with such overwhelming power had made a dramatic,
public decision to remain in the area, and had accordingly committed
economic and political resources, made it easier for other capitals to stay
in the Pittsburgh area.
How could it be that Mellon capital, which was financial in nature,
and generally thought to be the most mobile sort of capital, was appar-
ently not mobile at the crucial time for the Pittsburgh economy? 35 Sev-
34. This is discussed extensively in the deindustrialization literature. See, particularly, B.
BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA NEW YORK: PLANT
CLOSINGS, COMMUNITY ABANDONMENT AND THE DISMANTLING OF BASIC INDUSTRY (1982).
For a more recent bibliography see PLANT CLOSINGS: INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND SOCIAL
COSTS 161 (C. Perrucci, D. Targ & H. Targ eds. 1988).
35. That capital is perfectly mobile is an article of faith in neo-classical regional economics. It is
one of the pillars of the famous convergence hypothesis, found throughout the regional economics
literature. For early examples see G.H. BORTS & J.L. STEIN, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN A FREE
MARKET (1964); J.T. ROMANS, CAPITAL EXPORTS AND GROWTH AMONG U.S. REGIONS (1965).
In the presence of nationally integrated financial markets, capital, or at least money-capital, should
flow freely among regions so that the cost of capital varies very little across regions. Imperfectly
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eral factors conspired toward this lack of mobility. The Mellons'
dominance of the financial and corporate environment in the Pittsburgh
area was one. Had others perceived a move by the Mellons to abandon
Pittsburgh, their assets would have been unsalable except at tremendous
losses. No Buffalo-based financial group faced a problem of this magni-
tude since none were as large or dominant as the Mellon interests. The
depression of the 1930's certainly made geographic diversification more
difficult. Legal constraints on the banking industry, which interfered
with the free capital market, also contributed to Mellon immobility. To
the extent that this also forced the Mellons to engage in active, local
redevelopment, it also contributed to Pittsburgh's "Renaissance."
Legal impediments to capital mobility presented by federal law had
different effects in Pittsburgh and Buffalo because of differences in state
law.36 Pennsylvania law permitted banks to obtain or establish branches
and subsidiaries only within three contiguous counties.37 During the de-
pression of the 1930's the Mellon Bank expanded in Western Penn-
sylvania. At the same time more liberal New York State banking laws
allowed the Marine Midland Bank of Buffalo to obtain some 28 addi-
tional subsidiaries across the entire state.3" Mellon capital was further
hemmed in by the Glass-Steagall prohibition of investment banking by
commercial banks, and the Douglas Amendment to the Bank holding
Act of 1956, which until 1980 effectively prohibited interstate banking.39
Neither of these impeded the flow of capital out of Buffalo, since it could
integrated national financial markets might have further reduced the geographic mobility of Mellon
capital. Losch observed that as late as the 1930's, interest rates varied as distance from the dominant
financial center, New York City, increased. Because the Mellons were nationally so well connected,
this would have had only a minor impact on their relocation plans. THE ECONOMICS OF LOCATION
(W. Woglon trans. 2d rev. ed. 1954).
36. The McFadden Act of 1927, 12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 332 (1982). The act permitted nationally
chartered banks to have bank branches within the home city of the bank provided that state laws
allowed state banks similar branching powers. The Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), 12
U.S.C. § 217 (1982) allowed national banks the same banking privileges as state banks within their
home state.
37. This law was pushed through the state legislature by a coalition of Pittsburgh and small
town bankers who feared competition form the large Philadelphia banks.
38. MARINE MIDLAND BANK, INC., HERITAGE AND HORIZONS: THE MARINE MIDLAND
STORY 7.
39. The Douglas Amendment, § 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841, 1842(d)), forbade a bank holding company to acquire a commercial bank
subsidiary located across state lines unless the laws of the state in which the subsidiary is located
specifically allow out-of-state bank holding companies to enter. Since no states had done so until
1980, this effectively prevented interstate commercial banking. These laws made it all the more
difficult for the Mellons to effect an exit from Pittsburgh by transferring capital among their corpo-
rate entities.
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freely migrate within New York State to the nation's financial capital,
New York City.
Why would R. K. Mellon spearhead an urban renewal effort aimed
particularly at preventing corporate headquarters from moving out of
Pittsburgh? The immobility of their assets was, after all, not permanent.
Over the long run, establishing a new operative center would appear to
have been feasible. By WWII they had acquired a large interest in First
Boston Corp., an investment bank in New York City. But the Melons
were primarily commercial bankers.' Both their continued control over
"Mellon companies," and the financial strength of Mellon Bank to a
large degree depended on proximity to corporate customers - a proxim-
ity that would have been lost, had there been an exodus of corporate
headquarters from Pittsburgh. Preventing this became the only way for
them to defend their banking assets in Pittsburgh against significant loss.
When asked why he devoted so much time and energy to improving
Pittsburgh, R.K. Mellon responded, "Let's say selfish interests are in-
volved. We have a lot of property here. We can't very well move out
banks." 41
FRAGMENTATION VERSUS CONCENTRATION
The concentration of capital in Pittsburgh, as opposed to the frag-
mented business "community" of Buffalo, played an important factor in
establishing Pittsburgh's "Renaissance", and ensuring its continued suc-
cess. Just the fact that there would be fewer actors whose cooperation
would constitute a critical mass, itself makes cooperation in Pittsburgh
easier. The same is true of the degree to which local enterprises are al-
ready tied together by common business relationships. Several large cor-
porations headquartered in Pittsburgh have long-standing ownership and
financial ties with the Mellon interests. Buffalo corporations, on the
other hand, often had stronger relations with outside financial institu-
tions, than with local.
Many community, labor and church activists have viewed outside
ownership as one cause of massive plant closing. This reflects a reason-
40. See D. KoTz, BANK CONTROL OF LARGE CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 38
(1978). The Mellon modus operandi followed two strategies. First, they would advance commercial
loans in exchange for ownership interest and/or control, as in the case of Alcoa and Carborundum.
Second, they would force New York finance capital to buy out Mellon companies at high prices in
order to preserve monopoly positions. They built an oil pipeline across Pennsylvania which they
sold to Rockerfeller's Standard Oil, and built steel plants which they exchanged for 25% of U.S.
Steel.
41. B. HERSH, supra note 15, at 369.
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able belief that locally owned firms are more likely to reinvest in their
local facilities, and less likely to relocate production. But the presence of
corporate headquarters in-and-of itself is not a sufficient guarantee that
local production will not pack up and leave. The most recent example of
this in Buffalo is the Trico relocation to Mexico.42 This should not be
viewed as the result of unique circumstances. The steel industry had no
compunction about closing down production in their headquarter region,
the Pittsburgh area.
The real determinant of commitment to the local community by a
business may be its size. Small manufacturers are denied economies of
scale in moving. The difficulty and cost of attaining crucial information
about a prospective location alone can be formidable. Since small firms
are also more likely to be locally owned, this might appear as an attribute
of local ownership rather than firm size. When firm relocation also in-
volves owner or CEO relocation, the decision is also a migration deci-
sion. If top management is not ready to relocate home and family, the
decision to move corporate headquarters will not be made.43 Thus,
heightened commitment to a community may indeed be more likely for
small firms.'
For larger firms a different principle applies, namely a cooperative
strategy with mutual payoffs for all participants must be established to
prevent relocation. Once a cooperative redevelopment effort is estab-
lished among the elite, the problem of making it outperform the likely
non-cooperative outcome remains. If the cooperative game benefitted the
Mellon interests alone, Pittsburgh would not have fared as well as it did.
A broad range of important players, both economic and political, must
benefit or the cooperative group will be too narrow to be effective, or
simply will fall apart. The ability to attract outside private capital is
important to the success of a cooperative strategy. In this, the sheer size
and connectedness in corporate and political networks of Pittsburgh cor,
porations gave its redevelopment efforts access to capital sources which
were not available to the Buffalo elite.45 The Mellons obtained resource
commitments from Equitable Life and many of the largest Pittsburgh
42. See T. Byrly, S. Davis, F. Floss & W. Ganley, An Economic Analysis of Trico (Jan. 1986)
(unpublished paper for the Center for Applied Research in Urban and Regional Development, Buf-
falo State College).
43. This is the known as the "agency problem" in economics.
44. The form of ownership may also play a role here. An employee-owned and controlled firm
is not likely to move.
45. See S. MENSHIKOV, MILLIONAIRES AND MANAGERS (1969); B. MINTZ & M. SCHWARTZ,
THE POWER STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN BUSINESS (1985).
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corporations in support of the early, and crucial Gateway Center
project.46
THE FoRM OF ORGANIZATION: THE POLITICS OF RESTRUCTURING
The way in which the elite organizes its consensus, and the political
environment are also factors affecting the success or failure of a collabo-
rative redevelopment effort. Having decided to stay and fight, R. K.
Mellon used his considerable political sophistication, as well as economic
brute force, to achieve his ends. The fact that the unity of the bourgeoi-
sie was engineered through the ACCD rather than through a govern-
ment agency effectively removed the intra-class conflict accompanying
this effort from public debate. This accounts, in part, for the relative
orderliness of restructuring (until the mid-1970's). The ACCD enabled
close coordination of public and private plans and strategy over several
decades without public scrutiny. The ACCD also improved Mellon con-
trol of the Republican party, which controlled the state legislature.
Many of the important financial backers of the local Republican Party
were connected to the ACCD. Partisan squabbles were avoided, making
possible the close alliance between Mellon and the locally all-powerful
Democratic Party. The Democratic Party was relatively unified and
willing to cooperate with the Republican corporate executives who were
behind the ACCD. In return, the Republican Party never made a serious
run at Pittsburgh government. When out of town, R.K. Mellon was al-
ways sure to leave the mayor a number where he could be reached. At
every stage, planning downtown redevelopment proceeded with the close
cooperation of all politicians, bureaucrats, and corporate executives.
Buffalo's particularly fractious city politics presented further obsta-
cles to collaborative redevelopment. In Post-War Buffalo the possibility
of planning a resurgent downtown was repeatedly sacrificed to political
and bureaucratic in-fighting, and partisan politics. Under duress the
Buffalo City Planning Commission presented a comprehensive plan in
1950. The Housing Act of 1949 conditioned funding on some form of
comprehensive planning.47  While the plan assumed a massively
redeveloped downtown, it did little toward that end. Instead it at-
tempted to settle a score of political difficulties facing the city administra-
tion and Common Council.4 8
46. LUBOVE, TWENTIETH CENTURY PITTSBURGH, supra note 20.
47. See F. Palen, City Planning in Buffalo, New York: A History of Institutions 166 (1983)
(unpublished manuscript, State University of New York at Buffalo, School of Law).
48. See id. at 176-80
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Significant and continuous employment decline in manufacturing,
even when not offset by growth in other sectors, does not necessarily
imply a politically weakened elite. An elite unified around a redevelop-
ment strategy can easily control the redevelopment agenda, and reem-
ployment of industrial workers may be a relatively low priority. It was
impossible for organized labor or community groups to oppose air pollu-
tion control or the redevelopment of industrial and commercial land into
a downtown park, even if a feasible alternative had been presented. In
fact, few noticed that steel and other "dirty" industries had no place in
the reborn Pittsburgh until it was much too late. Recent attempts to
include those left out of the new Pittsburgh of finance and corporate
headquarters have failed to appreciate the degree of sophistication of,
and grass roots support for the ACCD redevelopment strategy and tac-
tics. The ACCD was able to garner sufficient political support for the
"Renaissance" program and its successor, "Renaissance II," even in the
face of dramatically declining manufacturing employment.
The elite of Buffalo are not nearly as well-organized as those of
Pittsburgh... YET. The remaining economic elites in Buffalo are immo-
bile because so much of their assets are tied up in local concerns, real
estate, sports teams, small local banks and regional banks. They are frag-
mented but increasingly immobile. Most of those who could leave with-
out significant loss have done so.49 It is this immobility more than
anything else that forced the formation of loose pro-growth coalitions
like the "group of 18" and "Buffalo 2000." The "group of 18" appar-
ently believes the future of Buffalo is in small and medium-sized (read
immobile) manufacturing, some back-offices for finance and other rou-
tine headquarter functions, trade with Canada, and satellite-city func-
tions for Toronto.5" There is no reason that the loose growth coalition
can't continue to garner support in spite of declining manufacturing and,
boosterism not-withstanding, a stagnant or declining economy.
There is also nothing in principle that blocks community and other
non-elite groups from forming their own cooperative grouping. The eco-
nomic elite have yet to seize control of the redevelopment agenda. They
are still competing with each other for direct benefits such as public fund-
ing for new offices. After more than a decade in office, Mayor Griffin has
49. Trico is a medium sized firm that was formerly a wholly local operation. It has probably
overreached itself by moving most of its production to Mexico. As a result, it is a much weakened
firm. The example of Trico was not lost on the business community. Relocation is not a viable
option for most of the firms that remain in the Buffalo area. See Business First (which has carded
extensive reportage on Trico over the years).
50. 'Group of 18' Strives to Boost Economy, Buffalo News, Oct. 12, 1986, at A-I, col. 2.
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yet to adopt their agenda, if "they" have one, as his own. An alternative
development coalition might attract support from area businesses, even
some of the elite. At the very least it could block an organized restruc-
turing effort that is inimicable to neighborhoods and working people.
A non-elite cooperative effort is not easily organized. Difficulties
arise from a lack of resources which lead to strong competitive pressures
among neighborhoods. Too often cooperation among non-elite groups
effectively faces a zero sum game. The ability to generate recognizable
benefits that clearly result from cooperation is limited. Fragmentation
and large numbers are also major problems confronting labor and com-
munity groups attempting the same type of cooperative venture. There
remains a window of opportunity for a community and labor-based eco-
nomic revitalization strategy in Buffalo.

